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Economists were no better prepared to understand and guide the course of the
unexpected transitions from command to market economies than were political
scientists to understand and guide the even more numerous transitions from
autocracy to democracy, but they did have one major advantage. They had a
Leitmotif which -if followed assiduously enough- seemed to guarantee success:
Get The Prices Right!
Political scientists also had a potential slogan to peddle, but they were less
assertive (and, perhaps, less self-convinced) than their economist brethren that it
would work in all settings, times and places: Get The Parties Right! For there is
hardly a serious student of democracy who does not seem to believe that political
parties provide by far the most important linkage between citizens and the
political process and that party platforms provide the best possible means for
aggregating diverse interests and passions into a coherent, system-wide mix of
public policies and that competition between these parties provides the most
reliable mechanism for ensuring the accountability of rulers and that cooperation
within and between these parties provides the only feasible way of forming viable
governments1. However, and unfortunately for the prestige of their discipline,
political scientists are not so sure that they know what to do in order to get the
parties right. Economists, especially those of the hegemonic neo-liberal
persuasion, are very confident that they understand what it takes to get the prices
right -and free trade in the international market conveniently tells them when they
have reached their goal. Alas, there is no perfect market in political parties
operating across national boundaries!
In this essay, I shall explore critically this orthodoxy with respect to the
leading role of political parties and ask whether or not other types of organized
intermediaries might have their significant role to play in promoting the
consolidation of democracy -at least, in the contemporary period. But, first, a brief
excursus into the meaning of some of the key concepts.
CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Theoretically, the notion of consolidating democracy sounds puzzling and
even oxymoronic. Intuitively, however, its meaning seems rather obvious. After a
period of considerable uncertainty and unknown duration during which the
previous autocracy “transits” to some other form of political domination, it
becomes necessary to transform its improvisations into stable rules and alliances
under which actors can compete and cooperate on predictable terms. From a
“war of movement” in which many have high expectations (and some have great
fears) about the magnitude of change, the democratic struggle should settle into a
“war of positions” along established lines of cleavage for mutually agreed upon
advantage2. Consolidation could be defined as the process of transforming the
accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions that have
emerged during the transition into relations of cooperation and competition that
are reliably known, regularly practiced and voluntarily accepted by those persons
or collectivities, i.e. politicians and citizens, that participate in democratic
governance. If it sets in, the democratic regime will have institutionalized
uncertainty in certain roles and policy areas, but it will also have reassured its
citizens that the competition to occupy office and/or to exercise influence will be
fair and circumscribed to a predictable range of outcomes. Modern,
representative, political democracy rests on this “bounded uncertainty” and the
“contingent consent” of actors to respect the outcomes it produces3.
Nothing ensures that consolidation will be successful in all cases -unless
one assumes (as very few analysts do these days) that democracy is either a
functional requisite or an ethical imperative. Neither the level of economic
development, the stage of capitalist accumulation nor the hegemony of the
bourgeoisie can automatically guarantee the advent, much less the persistence of
democracy. Nor is this regime outcome the inevitable product of some previously
attained level of “civilization”, literacy, educational attainment or distinctive
political culture. This is not to deny that affluence, a relatively equal distribution of
wealth, an internationally competitive economy, a well-schooled population, a
large middle-class and a willingness to tolerate diversity, to trust adversaries and
to settle conflicts by compromise are not advantageous; just that democracy still
has to be chosen, implemented and perpetuated by “agents”, real live political
actors with their distinctive interests, passions, memories and, why not, fortuna
and virtù . No doubt, they will be constrained by the above developmental and
cultural factors, but there is still plenty of room for making right or wrong choices.
Even the most inauspicious setting can still give rise to an attempt to democratize,
vide Haiti, Mongolia, Benin and Albania and, who knows, some of them may
succeed -vide India, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Portugal and Papua-New Guinea, none
of which seemed to stand much of a chance when they began changing regimes.
Let us not, however, be misled by all this emphasis on choice and
voluntaristic action. The core of the consolidation dilemma lies in coming up with
a set of concrete institutions that politicians can agree upon and citizens are
willing to support in a specific context. Arriving at a stable solution, especially in
the climate of exaggerated expectations that tends to characterize the transition,
is no easy matter. Not only are the choices intrinsically conflictual -with
different parties of politicians preferring rules that will ensure their own re-election
or eventual access to power, and different groups of citizens wanting rules that
will ensure the accountability of their professional agents- but they are also
extrinsically consequential. Once they are translated via electoral uncertainty
into governments that begin to produce public policies, they will affect rates of
economic growth, willingness to invest, competitiveness in foreign markets,
distributions of income and wealth, access to education, perceptions of cultural
deprivation, racial balance, and even national identity. To a certain extent, these
substantive matters are anticipated by actors and incorporated in the
compromises they make with regard to procedures, but there is lots of room for
error and unintended consequence. In the short run, the consolidation of
democracy depends on actors’ and citizens’ ability to come up with a solution to
their intrinsic conflicts over rules; in the long run, it will depend upon the extrinsic
impact that policies made under these rules will have upon social groups. Here is
where the “objective structural realities” of levels of development, positions in the
world economy, conflicts over sectoral product and distributions of welfare, and
the “subjective preferences” of classes, generations, genders, etnies, status
groups and situses re-enter the picture with a vengeance. Given the likelihood
that some time must elapse before the new rules of cooperation and competition
produce observable results, it seems safe to assume that the process of
consolidation will be a great deal lengthier than that of transition.
REPRESENTATION AND TYPES OF INTERMEDIARIES
Whatever institutions are chosen and implemented in a given context, it is
very likely that the solution will involve a central role for mechanisms of
representation. Modern democracy -at least, in all polities above a certain scale-
relies heavily on the indirect, not to say, vicarious participation of its citizens.
Rulers are held accountable -if at all- by competition and cooperation among
intermediary agents who “re-present” the interests and passions of citizens,
grouped in various categories and levels of aggregation, before public officials.
Moreover, these intermediaries have become more organized, specialized and
professionalized over time in the roles they perform. And, as we shall see, they
have recourse to a greater variety of channels of representation and levels of
aggregation than in the past.
Which is one of the major reasons why it may not be so prudent to assume
that most, if not all, of the work of representation will performed by political parties
-especially when it comes to accomplishing the very complicated task of
consolidating a viable democratic regime. Just a moment’s glance at any
Established Liberal Democracy (ELD) would reveal how many of these multiple
channels between citizens/firms and authorities/agencies are filled with
organizations other than parties. Even more disturbing is the observation that
much of this activity by intermediaries has little or no relation to what parties
supposedly do best, i.e. structure electoral choices and form governments.
Hence, consolidating contemporary democracy may be a more
differentiated and variegated process than in the past. My suspicion is that many
students of Fledgling Neo-Democracies (FNDs) are committing one or both of two
potential fallacies of anachronism:
(1) either they are ignoring the very substantial changes that have taken
place in the nature and role of parties in ELDs; or
(2) they are presuming that parties in today’s FLDs will have to go through
all the stages and perform all the functions of their predecessors.
I believe that it is preferable to assume that today’s citizens  -even in
polities that have long suffered under authoritarian rule- have quite different
organizational skills, are less likely to identify so closely with partisan symbols or
programs, and more likely to defend a much more variegated set of interests than
in the past. Moreover, the new regimes are emerging in an international
environment virtually saturated with different models of successful collective
action. All this may not strictly preclude a hegemonic role for parties in the
consolidation process, but it does suggest that they will be facing more
competition from interest associations and social movements than their
predecessors, and that we should revise our thinking about democratization
accordingly.
For simplicity sake, let us delineate three generic types of intermediaries:
political parties (PPs), interest associations (IAs) and social movements
(SMs). All are organizations; all attempt to link the preferences of persons,
families and firms to various agents and agencies of government; all seek to
aggregate the individual preferences of their members or categories into
collective demands; all are protected by formal political rights of assembly and
petition in democracies; all have some degree of autonomy in their internal
processes; all wish to influence the form and content of public policy. Within each
type, needless to say, there are major differences in organizational structure,
material resources, size of membership, degree of loyalty, extent of
encompassingness, strategies of influence, likelihood of success, and so forth -
but what interests us most are the differences between these three types of
intermediaries and how these differences might influence the consolidation of
democracy.
The distinguishing characteristic of PPs is their role  in the conduct of
territorially-based elections. They nominate candidates to compete in these
periodic events who, if they win, occupy specified positions of authority, form a
government and accept responsibility for the conduct of public policy. IAs seek to
influence the direction of policy so that it will benefit particularly (and, if possible,
exclusively) their own members without competing in elections or being publicly
accountable for these policies. SMs are also in the business of trying to exert
influence over policy without competing in elections or becoming accountable to
the public as a whole, but the benefits which they typically seek would accrue, not
specifically to their own members, but to a broad spectrum of the citizenry -even
to foreigners, plants, animals, fishes, reptiles and prospective beings from other
planets. These different foci of activity tend to imply other modal differences in
organizational structure, relations between followers and leaders, motives for
participation, level and type of resource mobilization, dependence upon allies and
external sources of support, capacity to incite loyalty or hatred, etc.
Needless to say, the three categories are not airtight; mutants and hybrids
are being born all the time. Nor is it the case that every organization that calls
itself a party, an association or a movement really deserves the label. Lots of
parties inscribed on the electoral lists never stand any realistic chance of winning
and are therefore associations or movements “in disguise”. Some IAs can
become so influential that they determine the occupants of specific government
roles and are even “credited” by the public with direct responsibility for public
policies; some SMs pretend to speak for broad social categories, but are really
interested in promoting the welfare of their own members -even only the welfare
of their own staffs. The only claim that I am advancing for this trilogy, beyond its
obvious utility in reducing a wide range of variance, is that there tends to exist
greater variation in organizational characteristics across these categories than
within them.
On the basis of this descriptive claim, I will advance the hypothesis that
these three types of intermediaries all play a significant role in the
consolidation of FNDs and, moreover, there is no longer any a priori reason
to suppose that PPs should be privileged or predominant in this regard.
Contemporary democratizers are the beneficiaries-cum-victims of a worldwide
process of diffusion of organizational forms and techniques. Once their transitions
from autocracy have begun and minimal rights of assembly and petition have
been established, they are likely to be literally invaded by parties, associations
and movements of extraordinary variety -some of which had no previous
experience or objective basis in the country. This is the exotic “flora and fauna”
that FNDs must simultaneously deal with if they are to consolidate their regime
changes, not the gradually shifting and usually sequenced emergence of
intermediaries that populated the earlier cases of democratization in the ELDs.
Political parties may have played that leading role in the past, but not necessarily
in the present or future.
THE (CONSOLIDATING) FUNCTIONS OF PARTIES
One way of exploring this rather unorthodox assertion is to take a (critical)
look at the “functions” which political parties are supposed to perform, especially
in the light of what it is supposed to take to consolidate a democratic polity. The
list of benevolent tasks (“eufunctions”) that PPs are capable of performing is very
extensive. If one is to believe the literature, there seems to be almost nothing that
political parties have not done, at one time or another. However, if one attempts
to separate out those tasks which are only performed by some “super-party” (the
German SPD or the Swedish SAP have often been exploited to illustrate how
many things PPs are capable of doing), the number of “functions of partisanship”
shrinks considerably.
1. Political parties, first and foremost, should structure the electoral
process by nominating candidates for office, by recruiting persons to
participate actively in campaigns and, thereby, by offering to citizens
aggregated in territorial constituencies a choice between alternative sets of
leaders. The successful performance of this function becomes considerably more
difficult if one adds the caveat, proposed by Norberto Bobbio, that the alternative
products offered to the “electoral consumer” should be real and significant in
terms of citizen preferences. Let us call this: the function of “electoral
structuration”.
2. Political parties should provide most citizens with a stable and
distinctive set of ideas and goals (symbols) which anchor their expectations
about democracy, orient them in a general way toward policy options and
make them feel part of the process of collective choice. Needless to say, this
function of “symbolic integration” makes a significant contribution to success in
performing the function of electoral structuration, although there is reason to
believe that party identification can only be acquired gradually across several
political generations4.
3. Political parties, once they have competed in the electoral process,
should be capable of forming a government and of providing an internal
structure to the legislative process -whether they do so alone or in alliance
with other parties and whether the executive and legislative posts are
independently or concurrently filled. Nota bene that, in order to do this well, PPs
should be capable of maintaining a consistently high level of internal discipline
during their terms in office, although to make this a strict functional requisite
would surely disqualify many electoral groupings from acquiring the label of
parties. We will call this: the “governing function”.
4. Underlying all of the above functions is a single assumption: political
parties must be capable of aggregating the interests and passions of a
significant proportion of the citizenry by channelling the expectations of
these individuals, families, firms, associations and movements through
their internal processes and producing a program that mixes public policies
in such a way as to satisfy the general demands of their constituents. It
should be noted that it is not required (or even expected) the PPs will monopolize
the “aggregative function” and, hence, force all individuals and collectivities to
process their expectations through partisan channels. The process of
representation is capacious enough than some persons and groups should find
room to interact directly with authorities, but it should be the system of PPs that
plays the most prominent role in packaging the more discrete and fragmentary
demands into more manageable general objectives and proposals.
Not all individual parties perform these functions and some of them may
engage in a much broader range of activities: entertainment; civic education;
policy analysis; publication of newspapers; ownership or control of broadcasting
facilities; provision of social services; staffing of public enterprises; management
of cooperatives; recruitment and training of association and movement leaders;
maintenance of public order; formation of shadow cabinets; and so forth. But
where the system of political parties as an ensemble does not fulfill the above
four “core” functions, or even where if finds itself competing heavily with other
intermediaries to do so, one can legitimately question whether or not PPs are
really so indispensable for the consolidation or simple perpetuation of
democracy5.
THE FUNCTION OF STRUCTURING ELECTORAL COMPETITION
This is the primary function for PPs, in the sense that it is this activity that
constitutes their strongest claim to a distinctive political role. And there is no
question that organizing rival candidacies for office and campaigning for the vote
of citizens in territorial constituencies was crucial for their initial prominence in
most FNDs. Parties had relatively little to do with the timing and even the content
of the transition itself, but once credible elections had been convoked and their
outcome was uncertain, they took over center stage from the governing factions,
interest associations and social movements that (usually) had contributed more to
bringing about a change in regime. Leaders, funds, energies and expectations
shifted toward those intermediary organizations that got their names onto the
electoral lists. Depending on the party and electoral laws (which the initial parties
often had a major role in drafting, hence, the consequent difficulty in deciding
whether the electoral law “produced” the party system or vice-versa), the number
that managed to do so varied considerably: relatively few in Southern Europe
where the continuity with past labels was greater; more in Latin American
parliamentary elections and fewer due to the polarizing effect of presidential
elections; and very much more in Eastern Europe where partisan continuity was
lowest and the thresholds for registration of new parties unusually low.
The subsequent “founding elections” were (usually) held in an atmosphere
of “civic orgy” with exceptionally high turnouts and the pageantry of a national
revival. Only in Hungary did less than 65% go to the polls initially6. However, with
almost monotonic regularity, the rate of abstention rose with each election
thereafter. In Southern Europe where regime consolidation has been greatest, the
turnout rate has tended to stabilize within the relatively high range that is
characteristic of well-established democracies in the rest of Europe. In Eastern
Europe where initial expectations were probably higher, the subsequent
disenchantment (desencanto) with electoral contests has also been greater. In
the Polish local elections of June 1994, the turnout dropped to American levels:
34.1%7.
It is in two important regards that PPs do not seem to be capable of
performing well their “historic” function of structuring electoral choices in a reliable
and relevant fashion:
(1) Politicians without the support of major parties have not only managed
to get themselves nominated as candidates for high office and run on “anti-party”
programs, but they have been rewarded for doing so by the electorate.
Admittedly, this is predominantly a Latin American trait, with Alberto Fujimori of
Peru as the prototype, followed by Fernando Color and, subsequently, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso in Brazil and Rafael Caldera in Venezuela. All were elected
despite rather than because of the pre-existing party system. In Argentina,
Carlos Menem was duly nominated by “his” party, but he subsequently chose to
follow policies diametrically opposed to those historically associated with it (and to
those under which he had campaigned). Nevertheless, the candidacies of Lech
Walesa in Poland and Václav Havel in the Czech Republic have also been
distinctly “supra-party”, either in the sense that they were nominated without the
manifest effort of a party or that their election did not depend on the support of a
particular party or alliance of parties.
More-and-more one gains the impression that it is independent political
entrepreneurs who are buying an existing “party brand” or creating a new one
exclusively for their own purposes rather than vice-versa as is presumed by the
party literature. And even when an established one selects “its” candidate, the
campaign and subsequent process of forming a government depends more upon
that candidate’s personality than on party organization, finance and programs8.
To North Americans, this may sound like a familiar story, but to Europeans (from
whence most of the theorizing about the generic types and roles of parties has
tended to come) this must seem like a perversion of the norm -not to say, a threat
to democracy itself.
(2) Citizens in the FNDs seem aware of these “loose couplings” between
parties, their candidates and their platforms, and have responded
opportunistically by switching their voting preferences from one election to
another. According to data gathered by Maurizio Cotta on electoral volatility
between successive elections, four of the new democracies after the Second
World War had aggregate percentage shifts of 23% (Italy), 21% (Germany), 12%
(Austria) and 6% (France) -roughly comparable to the length of their preceding
autocracies9. In Southern Europe, the comparable figures between the first and
second elections were 22% (Greece), 11% (Portugal) and 11% (Spain). But the
biggest differences came between the second and third elections: 27% for
Greece, 10% for Portugal and a phenomenal 42% for Spain, while three of the
post-1945 democracies had markedly lower volatility in the second round (France
is the exception). In Latin America, the volatility has been even greater10, and in
Eastern Europe it has broken all records. For example in Poland, 70% of the
electorate switched parties from the first to the second elections -admittedly, the
latter were held under different rules- and another 35% from the second to the
third. In Slovakia, the aggregate percentage shift was 41%. It was a bit more
stable in the Czech Republic at 28%. The only Eastern European country with an
electorate that came even close to mimicking what Western European party
systems had displayed almost 50 years previously was Bulgaria with only a 20%
shift between the first and second elections, but that increased to 36% between
the second and third rounds)11.
All this is not to deny that PPs are unbeatable as intermediaries when it
comes to organizing territorial constituencies and simplifying voter choices -and
all FNDs need a competitive system of parties if they are to fulfill the formal
requisites for democratic status. What supra-party candidacies and elector
volatility do suggest, however, is that informal elite arrangements and
independent citizen reactions are bypassing these channels and, presumably,
decreasing the subsequent importance of party-structured legislatures and party-
identified voters. Even the elections themselves seem less-and-less capable of
providing citizens with a convincing link to the political process, as is witnessed by
falling rates of voter turnout.
THE FUNCTION OF PROVIDING SYMBOLIC IDENTITY
The primary weapon that PPs have in their effort to “fix” the electoral
preferences of the citizenry is their capacity to manipulate symbols and memories
in such a way that, over time, individuals come to identify with them. Regardless
of the candidate(s) they choose or the program(s) they espouse for a specific
contest, their core identifiers will vote for them as the party that “naturally”
represents them. Philip Converse has advanced a very elegant argument that this
necessarily involves the intergenerational transmission of norms and, hence, is
likely to take something on the order of 40+ years before the electorate as a
whole has acquired this “anchor” for their political/electoral expectations12.
Except in the rare case where the autocracy had been short-lived and PPs
from the former period could be easily revived, e.g. Greece, most contemporary
FNDs had to create a system of parties ex novo -often by borrowing names,
symbols, slogans and platforms from abroad or from the country’s very remote
past13. It quickly became apparent that these new PPs were not going to be
capable of replicating the heroic role that parties played in early democratizations.
For one thing, they have attracted very few card-carrying and dues-paying
members -even when one compares them only with the post-1945 democracies.
Italy probably represents the most “party-centric” case of consolidation during that
period and, appropriately, it has (or, better, had) one of the highest coefficients of
party membership among ELDs -about 14%. Greece with ca. 8% is the only FND
in Southern Europe that comes even close. Only 4 to 5% of Portuguese and
Spaniards admit to being members in any PP14. South Korea, Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, and Poland all report comparable or lower figures15. Only Bulgaria
(22%), Ukraine (15%), Czechoslovakia (11%, before the separation) and
Romania (9%) had higher proportions of the national sample in parties -and one
suspects that this is to be explained mainly by the larger number of “hangers-
over” from the previously dominant communist party.
For another, they did not seem even to be providing much of a diffuse
political identity for citizens. When asked whether they felt close to any political
party, national sample surveys reported as few agreeing as 19% in Poland, 36%
in South Korea and 37% in the Ukraine with most of the countries hovering
around the 50% mark (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Spain).
Only in Bulgaria and Romania did it approach 2/3 of the adult population -and that
presumably reflects greater continuity with the cadres of their respective
Communist Parties. Part of the reason for this can be gleaned from responses to
another question which asked whether parties offered different policies. In all of
the above countries (except for Poland and the Ukraine) between 65% and 75%
of those surveyed said that parties did not differ much from each other16.
So low are these figures for membership and identification that they call
into question one of the central tenets of party advocates, namely, that only PPs
are capable of “aggregating” the largest number of potential citizens and,
therefore, of representing the broadest, i.e. most public-regarding, range of
interests. In many FNDs, sports clubs, neighborhood groups, religious
associations and trade unions have much larger actual memberships than do
political parties -and one suspects they might even have a more socially
heterogeneous and committed membership. What is more to the point, however,
are the perceptions of citizens of the “representativeness” of these different
intermediaries. To my knowledge, no survey data on this issue exists for Southern
Europe and Latin America, but there is apposite research on four Eastern
European countries, thanks to the Central European University’s data files on
“The Development of Party Systems and Electoral Alignments in East-Central
Europe”. As reported by Gábor Tóka, the rankings on a 1 to 7 scale show that
political parties as a whole do worse than most types of associations and
movements, with environmentalist groups getting a particularly high rating. On the
other hand, the respondents tended to give a higher ranking to the party they
liked most than to any of the associations or movements. For example, those
giving an equal or better rating to non-party representatives than to their preferred
party were 46% in Slovakia, 41% in the Czech Republic, 37% in Poland and 30%
in Hungary. However, in Slovakia only 14% of the sample gave an absolutely
better score to some association or movement than to any of the major parties.
The proportion was 17% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Hungary and 31% in
Poland17. Without comparable figures, it is hard to judge whether this represents
a significant shift away from parties as the “natural” representative organization
for citizens.
There are other less obtrusive indicators of the declining capacity of PPs in
FNDs to provide a stable and valued political identity: the absence or virtual
disappearance of party newspapers; the substitution of voluntary by paid labor in
campaigns; the decline in attendance at party congresses (if and when they are
held at all); the failure of parties to penetrate, much less to control, associations
and movements as they often did in the past (especially on the Left); and, as the
operational culmination of all these micro-level trends -the much higher levels of
volatility in electoral outcomes and the much greater frequency with which
ruling/governing parties are thrown out of office!
THE FUNCTION OF FORMING GOVERNMENTS
Electoral structuration may be the most distinctive function of PPs, but the
most important when it comes to regime consolidation is their capacity to make
(and unmake) governments. Regardless of how parties do in presenting
alternative candidates and providing attractive political identities, if they are
incapable of playing a leading role in filling top political offices and supporting the
policies of a subsequent government, then, they are in deep trouble as agents of
democratization.
We have already hinted at one difficulty in performing this role: relatively
rapid turnover in power due to electoral volatility (or, in some parliamentary cases,
factional defections that result in premature elections). Historically -that is to say,
in the waves of democratization that accompanied World Wars One and Two- one
party tended to emerge as predominant because of its identification with the
change in regime and to remain in power for ten to twelve continuous years, e.g.,
Ireland, Finland, West Germany, Italy and Japan. In the post-1974 FNDs, the
opposite has occurred. In all but two cases (Chile and the Czech Republic) the
initially victorious party has been defeated in the first or second subsequent
election -and, often, by a large margin. This rapid turnover in power is not just an
unobtrusive indicator of the malperformance of the first two generic party
functions, but it is also a manifest sign that the new parties are having a difficult
time forming and, especially, retaining effective governments.
Also, part of the responsibility lies with the distinctive type of party that
often emerged as the winner of the founding elections. They have been dubbed
“Forum Parties” in that they provided a common platform for resistance against
the previous autocracy by grouping together a wide range of disparate political
formations. Initially, they were much closer to being social movements and some
were reluctant to transform themselves into parties. The Spanish UCD of Adolfo
Suárez was the prototype and, like its successors, it collapsed into a multitude of
factions once electoral competition really took hold -suffering the worst electoral
defeat (a loss of 29.3% points between the elections of 1979 and 1982) in the
history of modern democracy. Solidarity in Poland, Civic Forum and Public
Against Violence in Czechoslovakia, Popular Front in Estonia, Democratic Russia
in Russia and the UDF in Bulgaria had similar fates.
But this “birth defect” of some party systems is not enough to explain the
pervasive pattern of ineffectual party government. Granted that the winners in
today’s FNDs seem not to have enjoyed the same initial margins of victory as
their predecessors after 1918 or 1945 (although I admit that this is just an
impression since I have not yet gathered the requisite data), and granted that the
subsequent development of public opinion has made all elected governments
more susceptible to being rejected for their association with poor economic
performance (and I suspect, but cannot prove, that living standards, growth rates
and levels of employment declined more after democratization than previously -
especially, in Eastern Europe and the successor republics of the former Soviet
Union). Still, something has changed in the way that winning parties or coalitions
relate to the selection and control of leading government personnel.
Ironically, this cannot be due to any reluctance on the part of the winners to
assume the prerogatives of governing -occasional protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding. Quite the contrary! The “political class” that is forming in
contemporary FNDs is much more likely to be composed of aspirant professional
politicians, i.e. of persons who intend to live from and not just for politics. The
“founding fathers” of most ELDs consisted of relative amateurs who had other
professions and relatively little interest in perpetuating themselves in power. FND
políticos need continuous access to public authority (and even more specifically
to public money) since they often have no independent source of income to rely
upon and since their parties alone are incapable of rewarding them materially or
spiritually. Moreover, precisely because they have so few loyal dues-paying
members, contemporary PPs themselves have become much more reliant on
public funding. There has also been a tendency for the new constitutions to refer
more explicitly than in the past to the role of parties and even to attempt to ensure
them monopolistic access to specific funds and forums. The irony arises because,
despite these efforts, parties are less capable of exercising a monopoly over elite
selection, of disciplining the subsequent behavior of those who are selected or of
ensuring that their program gets implemented when “they” are in power.
Patronage in the sense of favoritism in appointments to government jobs and
awards of government contracts continues to be a mainstay of PPs and may even
have increased in importance under conditions of weak economic performance,
but effective control over the macro-aspects of public policy has declined.
The most obvious development limiting the government-forming and
policy-making role of parties in FNDs is “globalization/ regionalization”. Greater
and more complex forms of economic interdependence, reaching beyond the
traditional spheres of foreign trade and overseas fixed investment into the
productive structure of multi-national enterprises and the instantaneous flows of
speculative capital, have narrowed the range of “permissible” policies. Coupled
with this has come the formation of so-called “intergovernmental organizations”
(IGOs) such as the IMF and the IBRD at the global level or “supranational
organizations” such as the EC/EU and its various policy agencies at the regional
level. Their leverage is all the greater since most FNDs inherited economies mis-
developed, devastated and/or deeply indebted by preceding autocracies and
since the approval of an apposite functional IGO or membership in an appropriate
regional organization has become a virtually sina qua non for attracting badly
needed foreign investment. One of the most salient ways in which an FND can
obtain such a certificate of good conduct is place its macro-economic
management in the hands of technical experts whose competence is recognized
by these very same organizations. Needless to say, relatively few of these
technocrats have any stable party affiliations and their preferred solutions
frequently clash head on with the programs of parties, especially those on the
Left. Given the declining mobilizational capacity of these very same parties, it is
decreasingly likely that they will be able to contest the policies of their own
technocrats!
But my hunch is that the decline in the viability of the party government
function is not just the result of globalization or regionalization. Its deeper roots lie
in the combination of greater professionalization of the role of politician and
greater dependence upon the state for revenues and recognition. These,
obviously interrelated political factors, are driving PPs away from their earlier
functions of structuration and identification and that, in turn, makes it more difficult
for them to control the behavior of governing elites on the grounds that they “re-
present” the interests and passions of civil society and individual citizens. In the
corporatist version, the shift is toward organizations -mostly recognized and
monopolistic interest associations- that do not so much represent as intermediate
between members and authorities and, in so doing, play a key role in forming the
preferences of their members and in collaborating with authorities in the
implementation of policies.  In the (more common) pluralist version, the shift is
toward weaker and less “identifiable” political parties and stronger and more
“insistent” social movements -with less visible and highly specialized associations
(and even individual firms) working unobtrusively in the background, exploiting
direct contacts with public officials that circumvent partisan channels as much as
possible. Not an encouraging picture for PPs no matter which direction one looks!
THE FUNCTION OF AGGREGATING INTERESTS AND PASSIONS
Most of the normative case for the superiority of PPs as intermediaries
seems to hinge on the good performance of this function. Because parties are
the only institutions capable of aggregating a broad spectrum of interests and
passions, therefore they are the only ones legitimately entitled to rule in the
name of the society as a whole. Even though, by their etymological origin (if
nothing else), they are bound to represent only a “part” of the citizenry, the
competition between parties and/or the cooperation among parties when they
form governments is supposed to compel them to offer general programs
designed to appeal beyond their core militants and constituencies in ways that
are denied to interest associations and social movements -no matter how hard
the latter work at “catching” as many members as possible. Even if -as now
seems often the case- PPs have less members and -as sometimes seems the
case- less reputable images than IAs or SMs, the process of competition in which
they are engaged should force them to address larger issues and aspirations.
In earlier periods, the primary weapon of PPs as aggregators was their
articulation (one is tempted to say, their embodiment) of a distinctive ideology. By
offering to citizens a comprehensive vision of how much better the society might
look if they were given responsibility for governing, parties seemed to ensure that
the political process would attend to “the will of the public as a whole” and not just
the specialized interests of associations or momentary passions of movements18.
With the decline in credibility of most of these partisan ideologies and the
convergence toward a relatively narrow range of general policy objectives, PPs
tended to shift towards a “catch-all” strategy after World War Two that aimed at
appealing to as many voters as possible, i.e. to those closest to the median
position on most issues19. Not only did this weaken their symbolic capacity, but it
tended to encourage more opportunistic behavior on the part of the voters. Rather
than aggregate “actively” by asserting a higher public purpose, PPs aggregated
“passively” by assembling a multitude of private purposes. This helped some of
them, no doubt, to escape from their class or regional “ghettos” and to win
general elections, but only at the expense of their functional performance.
Parties in the post-1974 FNDs (with a few marginal exceptions) are the
beneficiaries-cum-victims of this prior decline in credible ideologies and
constriction in feasible policy alternatives. Not only have they a less differentiated
product to peddle, but most of them have virtually no accumulated “ideological
capital” to draw upon20. Moreover, they have to cope with three additional
difficulties in their contemporary efforts at aggregating interests and passions:
(1) Ideology was rarely the only aggregative device deployed by PPs. They
also tended to rely heavily on inter-organizational linkages with other types of
intermediaries. While this was particularly important for progressive parties in their
allegedly “organic” connection with the workers’ movement, trade unions,
producer and consumer cooperatives, etc., conservative parties also tended to
have stable alliances with business and professional associations, lodges and
fraternal societies. Where they existed, Farmers’ Parties were literally the
electoral expression of agrarian associations.
In FNDs, these linkages have proven much weaker -either because the
entire realm of civil society is less developed or because, thanks to the belated
timing of “free and fair” elections, newly emergent movements and associations
are much more concerned with protecting their organizational autonomy.
Moreover, in those cases where these units of civil society are being promoted by
outside actors, i.e. those famous NGOs, they are being advised (even compelled)
not to have any connection with PPs. In Southern Europe where there did exist
strong and resilient ties between movements, associations and parties at the
beginning of the transition, these weakened when the latter were forced by
international constraints to resort to restrictive policies that conflicted with the
specific interests of workers, retirees and other “policy-takers”21.
(2) The technology of electoral competition and, one is tempted to say,
politics in general has changed dramatically with developments in the mass
media. Parties no longer own or control their own media. And they have only very
limited channels of direct access to their members or potential voters (rallies,
caucuses, conventions, etc.). So, they must increasingly rely upon media owned
and controlled by others to send out their message. And where that media is
privately owned, competition among firms for audience shares and revenues
tends to bias not only the access that different parties have to their respective
publics, but also the content of their messages. State ownership of the media -
with a few honorable exceptions- virtually guarantees bias in favor of the
governing party.
Effective aggregation of interests and passions, if it takes place at all,
occurs not directly through channels internal to parties and their “sister”
organizations but indirectly through the media before undifferentiated mass
audiences. Especially when the message is transmitted via television, its form
and content must be tailored to fit parameters imposed by this medium -which
seems to have opened up the electoral process to “telegenic” candidates with
little or no party experience or loyalty.
(3) Closely coupled with the growing reliance on mass media has come
another shift in the technology of contemporary electoral politics: the development
and increased reliance upon opinion surveys and other polling devices to capture
the expectations of mass publics. Candidates, even those who go through the
ranks and are nominated by some regular party process, have tended to develop
their own apparatus for sounding out public opinion. They do not need to rely
upon partisan channels for guidance; indeed, in their quest for vote maximization,
they may become quite wary of such “biased” sources. Witness the enormous
rise in the importance of political consultants -most of whom are proud of their
ability to work across party lines. Not only has this already affected the electoral
process in FNDs, but the consultants they employ (at least, initially) are often
recruited from outside the country!22.
My hunch is that this ready availability of public opinion data has
undermined the aggregative role of PPs per se. Not only does the information
come to candidates independent from partisan channels, but they use it
“passively” to position themselves as closely as possible to the median voter on
each issue -irrespective of the compatibility of the positions they take. Parties
abandon all pretense of “actively” intervening to form and direct the opinions of
their members/followers toward some higher and more general set of goals. And,
once “their” candidate has won, he or she is saddled with a mish-mash of
incompatible (if popular) promises that cannot be satisfied simultaneously,
thereby, generating further disenchantment with the vacuousness of party
platforms and the perfidy of party politicians.
CONCLUSION
I would be the first to admit that what I have attempted above is what the
French call a réquisitoire -a selective and, therefore, biased assemblage of
observations intended to place the PPs of FNDs in the worst possible light. No
doubt, had I compiled more systematic data and evaluated them more objectively,
I would have uncovered greater evidence that political parties in the fifty or so
countries that have changed their regimes since 1974 have performed some
critical functions during the subsequent attempts to consolidate their respective
democratic regimes.
Nevertheless, one of the major reasons that I am so convinced of the basic
weakness of PPs in these FNDs is that virtually all the difficulties that they
have been experiencing are also being experienced by contemporary PPs in
the ELDs. The crisis of representation/intermediation through partisan channels
seems to be generic, not specific to neo-democracies.
This has been partially disguised by the fact that the older parties are still
drawing on political capital accumulated during their “heroic age” when they did
provide strong identities, offer dramatically different alternative programs, produce
major realignments in voter preferences, and form epochal governments that
appealed to a broad range of citizen interests and resolved major social,
economic or military crises. At least since the mid-1970s they have been
spending down this precious principal with each successive election. Only by
substituting state funds for the decline in symbolic identifications and voluntary
contributions and only by relying increasingly on the personal appeal of individual
candidates (many of whom have little or no prior party experience) instead of on
the compellingness of their programs have they managed to sustain their nominal
prominence in the minds of most citizens23.
Students of political parties are fond of using the metaphor of the
“gatekeeper” to describe their subject matter24. It seems to appeal to them to
think of political parties as if they constituted a select and disciplined corps of
actors, resplendent in their symbolic trappings, who effectively guard the Citadel
of Government by keeping the “special interests” articulated by individuals, firms,
localities, associations and movements from disturbing the rulers, and only letting
through the gates those that have been aggregated into broader, and possibly
more other-regarding “public interests”. Moreover, for most of these students, the
fewer the number of gatekeepers the better since that should ensure a more
encompassing process of aggregation.
But what if the gatekeepers were no longer guarding the “real” points of
access to political power? What if, inside the Citadel, there were an increasing
variety of specialized redoubts staffed by “guardians” recruited for their technical
expertise and their non-partisanship -each with its own secret passages?25. And
what if there were more-and-more political agents within the walls leaking
information to the hoi-polloi outside and letting them inside the Citadel discretely
through a proliferation of side-entrances? And what if the resplendent trappings of
those gatekeepers were increasingly paid for from public funds rather than
voluntary contributions, and their meager salaries were increasingly
supplemented by money and status coming from the more affluent individuals
and groups among the hoi-pollo? Would students of democratic politics then
spend so much of their time and effort studying political parties?
So, ironically and retrospectively, it may be fortunate that political scientists
did not rely so heavily on that “Get the Parties Right” slogan. For, under
contemporary conditions, there may be no way to get them right -if, by right, one
means that they should be capable of performing well all those four functions and,
thereby, a role comparable to that which they played in earlier processes of
democratization.
Which is not to say that any of the other forms of organized intermediation
between citizens and public authorities are likely to do much better! Interest
associations and social movements are certainly more numerous and prominent
than during previous waves of democratization, but that does not imply that either
of them or both of them together can provide their members/followers with
overarching collective identities, structure political competition in meaningful
ways, form (and accept responsibility for) governing the polity and aggregate a
diversity of social interests and passions into a coherent program of government.
Contrary to the more organic versions of Functionalism (with a capital F),
there is no reason to expect that simply because these tasks are not being
adequately performed by PPs in most FNDs some other organization must take
them over. Nor do I see any a priori reason for assuming that all forms of
intermediation are locked into a zero-sum struggle for attention, loyalty, funds, or
whatever. Some democracies have strong parties, associations and movements;
others are weak in all of them; most have varied mixes of them.
What seems more probable (to me) is that FNDs, like many ELDs, are
going to have to survive with a lot less intermediation than in the past. Their PPs
will inevitably produce a great deal less electoral structuration, symbolic
identification, party governance and interest aggregation than did their
forerunners. What this implies for the “quality” of these neo-democracies is
another issue!
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